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WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
tive legal representation for the unpopular clients and causes, and for minorities,"
and have been conducive to more informed public decision-making. 6
The notion of lawyers' detachment, in the sense of professional independence,
is, I believe, a much more fragile ideal than those of friendship and communal
solidarity, and one that is much more in need of nurturing, in the interests of society
as a whole.
A COMMENT FOR TOM SHAFFER:
THE ETHICS OF RACE, THE ETHICS OF CORRUPTION
JAMEs J. FRIEDBERG*
Tom Shaffer does more than describe dissent. He endorses it. We know this
by the commentary that he interweaves with his narrative of the dissenting lawyers,
Fanny Holtzman and Jerry Kennedy. We know this still more by the approving,
even affectionate language with which he portrays these two lawyers. Sincerely af-
fectionate, although one of the two is a total stranger to him and the other is even
less-a creation of fiction. He endorses their dissent and he endorses their alter-
native ethic, as he sees it: that of the "immigrant" lawyer.
It is difficult for me to reject the lessons of Tom's homilies. Not only did
I intellectually share his regard for the values of community and friendship (which
are, as he implies, insufficiently influential in our profession and our society), but
I also feel a visceral, ethnic harmony with his theme of the salutary effects of the
immigrant community, of the importance of "going home". I grew up in that
Catholic/Jewish cultural millieu of which Tom writes. It shaped my values regard-
ing friends and decency. It also nurtured my intuitive skepticism regarding author-
ity. When I first heard Tom speak of "gentle cynicism", I immediately understood
what he meant, although I might not have been able to articulate it immediately.
Understanding what Tom means is made easier by the fact that he is not alienated
" See generally V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FINMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN SOCIETY
638-53 (2d ed. 1976).
6 The 1981 Proposed Final Draft of Model Rule 6.4 would have prohibited a lawyer from par-
ticipating in a decision of a law reform organization that "could have a direct material effect" on
a client. However, as such a prohibition would have prevented organizations seeking reform in specialized
fields like antitrust, tax, and securities law from taking advantage of the expertise of most practitioners
in those fields, the final version of the rule only requires that a lawyer disclose that a client might
be materially benefitted. PROPOSED MODEL RULES Rule 6.4 (1981).
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
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from what he says and writes-he personally exudes the qualities of decency, friend-
ship, and honesty that he describes and endorses in his work. It is easier to under-
stand what he is talking about, because he himself is what he is talking about.
This is not said to flatter, but to put criticism into context-for I am troubled
by his essay (as I was by his Donley lectures that preceded it). To explain this
discomfort, I will answer his stories with a story of my own.
COMMIUNITY AND RACISM
While talking to a new friend and coworker in Tennessee at my first job after
law school, our conversation turned to Boston. We both had attended law school
there. In the process of comparing favorite restaurtants, movie houses, country
drives, etc., I mentioned the North End-how much fun my wife and I had had
wandering the skinny, bricked streets of Boston's version of Little Italy, seeing
old men playing Bocci ball in a church yard, ducking into a cafe where we ate
cheese cannoli, sipped cappacino, and took in the warm, frenzied conversation that
surrounded us. My friend said she was not able to share that particular Boston
memory. Her husband is black. And, she informed me, mixed couples, or for that
matter, blacks individually, were not welcome in the North End.
The story highlights a problem with Tom Shaffer's stories about immigrant
lawyers. In that North End cafe and in those narrow alleys, my wife and I had
enjoyed the sort of immigrant community of which Tom Shaffer and Michael Novak
write. We had enjoyed its sense of warmth, ethnicity, and-well-belongingness.
And though, technically, we ourselves did not belong, we were able to experience
some of that feeling of community. This was partly because we were kindly treated
"tourists", but also, I think, because of a nostalgic intuition we possessed for the
life of our Eastern European grandparents and our first generation parents, who
had lived in Fanny Holtzman's America in the first half of this century. I believe
that Tom Shaffer and Michael Novak share this nostalgic intuition of an ethnic,
immigrant past. I also believe that it can become a pernicious nostalgia that masks
prejudice and excuses corruption.
Tom partly addresses this problem in his discussion of "preference", but I
do not believe his answers are sufficient. He briefly touches the issue of commun-
ity and racism toward the end of his article' where, once again, he instructs us
with a story:
In that story [by George V. Higgins], a leader of Boston's black community
says his greatest frustration has been to convince his constituents that their failure
to appreciate this gently cynical attitude explains why they don't gain more:
I've never been able to persuade them that in a good many cases where
we haven't gotten what we wanted, it wasn't because the people that we
Shaffer, THE ETHICS OF DISSENT AND FRIENDSHIP IN THE AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 88 W. VA.
L. REV. 623, 660-61 (1986).
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had to get it from hate [us]. It was because the people that we had to
get it from looked at what we wanted and didn't see anything in the re-
quest for them, so they torpedoed it. It wasn't racial. It wasn't even per-
sonal. It was just good business sense. I'm telling you, my friend, if I
could've figured out a way that blacks in Roxbury to qualify for good
jobs would've ended in unemployment for all the micks in Southie while
it was training blacks in Roxbury to qualify for good jobs too, it would've
slid through Bernie Morgan's legislature like it'd been on skates.
This is bad instruction. The fact that a fictional black character created by a white
man attributes the dilemma of black people to the black community's lack of political
acumen does not make it so. Anyone who lived in Higgins's Boston during the
early 1970s knows that it was not the failings of political horse trading that caused
the South Boston school riots. It was racism and economic deprivation-racism
in the very same ethnic community that spawned Jerry Kennedy. Anyone who doubts
this, should go to the back issues of the Boston Globe from that era and read
a couple dozen articles tracing the political career of Louise Day Hicks.
In fact, Higgins's solution proferred to black people is even less viable today
than it might have been in the recent past (say, at the time of the South Boston
school riots). And Michael Novak and his ideological compatriots are partly to
blame. For Higgins's brand of political pluralism to work, at least two factors are
necessary, both of which are more problematic today than they were ten years ago.
First, the black community needs a willing trading partner. Second, it needs
something to trade. The last decade, especially the last six years have seen blacks
lose ground in each of these areas. Erstwhile white ethnic political allies-never
fully reliable-have turned Republican and per capita black wealth, and concomi-
tant economic power, has diminished. The "neoconservative" political philosophy
represented by Novak and company is merely the theoretical (theological?) manifesta-
tion of Reagan's new majority. It provides a philosophical justification for the
movement of many white ethnics away from the New Deal coalition. It is a spiritual
pilgrimmage from the Bronx to West Chester County. The movement seems to
be dominated by Catholic and Jewish ex-liberal intellectuals who have discovered
the true religion of self-interest. Its learned teachings can be found in the pages
of post-detente Commentary magazine and other such places. And its logical con-
sequences are anti-black. A loss of traditional political allies and diminished economic
status are the bitter fruits blacks taste from the seeds of neo-conservatism. Not
much to trade with, Mr. Higgins.
Without access to at least the back door of the corridors of power, gentle
cynicism quickly becomes bitter alienation.
FRIENDSHIP AND CORRUPTION
In early January, 1986, the Public Broadcasting System aired a television pro-
gram called Rajiv's India. It focused on the social and political climate in India
under the new leadership of Rajiv Gandhi, son and grandson of India's two most
powerful previous prime ministers, Indira Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. An eighty-
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year old Indian who publishes one of the country's major newspapers, the Indian
Express, was interviewed during the program. He recalled his active public opposi-
tion to Indira Gandhi when, about a decade ago, she had threatened democracy
in India by declaring a state of emergency that severely restricted civil and political
rights. He had voiced such risky dissent despite the fact that he had been a long
'time friend of the Gandhi family. Essentially what he said on camera was this:
Indira Gandhi was my friend; her husband had been my friend and colleague; but,
friendship had to put aside-larger things were at stake-the good of the country.
The Indian publisher's dissent contains greater social virtue in its particular
rejection of friendship than Jerry Kennedy's form of dissent contains in relying
on friendship. When George Higgins's brand of friendship is raised above the more
traditional "Jeffersonian" values of republican democracy in public life, the result
is often not social virtue at all, but corruption.
Another example is in order. For a time it was fashionable among some revi-
sionist observers of urban politics to argue that the corrupt (by Jeffersonian stan-
dards) city government of Richard Daley in Chicago was not all that bad. In fact,
they argued, it was good. The snow was plowed, for example, and the garbage
was removed. However, if it was good, it was only so for those persons and
neighborhoods that supported the mayor. And only for as long as they supported
him. Hopefully, by now, the failings in civic virtue of the Daley regime is beyond
serious debate.
However, there is something in Tom Shaffer's article that seems sympathetic
with Daleyism. in one of his presentations during his two-day Donley residency
at the law school, Tom seemed to good humoredly acknowledge this possibility
by-characteristically-telling a story. He told of an old Mayor Daley anecdote,
in which his honor was purported to have responded to a charge of graft (granting
a lucrative city insurance contract to a friend's son) by asking, "If a fellow can't
help out a friend, then what are friends for?"
Where does friendship end and corruption begin in Tom Shaffer's world of
community, of fidelity? Given his approving reference, as an example of community,
to the Jerry Kennedy sequence, where our working class hero qua attorney springs
his auto thief friend/client from police custody because of Jerry's relationship with
the desk sergeant, he is willing to categorize as friendship at least some activity
that many of us would call corruption. And before I am accused of priggish naivete
regarding the behavior of street level bureaucrats, let's change the hypothetical a
bit. (A hypothetical it is, of course, since Jerry Kennedy does not exist-he is Hig-
gins's creation). Let's say Jerry's client sells heroin, rather than stealing cars. (Hig-
gins has provided us with a character that conveniently only violates property rights
and, thus, does not test our consciences). Wouldn't the bonds that link desk sergeant
and Jerry and client still be those of community and friendship? But, we are told
Aristotle teaches that friendship only schools us in good acts.' Perhaps by defini-
' Id. at 649.
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tion, Kennedy could not be the friend of a heroin pusher. The distinctions begin
to strain. The reality of Chicago and Boston does not seem to be well predicted
by Aristotle's view of friendship as a school for virtue.
Perhaps Tom would respond that I misconceive his vision of friendship as a
social virtue, that I am missing his distinction between fidelity and loyalty, that
Daleyism is a public manifestation of blind loyalty, not friendship. That the Indian
publisher stood against dictatorship was not a rejection of friendship, but an ex-
pression of constancy. The problem is that the distinction between fidelity and loyalty
does not work. And Tom's treatment of the closely related issue of preference is
as unresponsive to the problem of corruption as it is to the problem of racial
prejudice.
It is simply too difficult to identify a workable distinction between fidelity and
loyalty, as Tom uses these concepts, which shows that friendship in civic life operates
for social virtue, but not social evil. It is not enough to define loyalty, at Tom
does, as hating a friend's enemy and fidelity as constancy. A public official can
be constant in his corrupt nature and harmful to those not lucky enough to be
his friends. Not all evil people are chameleons.
AN ALTERNATIVE ALTERNATIVE
Tom Shaffer is mostly right. The old boy ethics are flawed in the very ways
that he and, implicitly, his dissenters reveal. The old boys do tend to codify self
interest and call it professional responsibility. And they are less than honest in
their denial of the role of friendship among themselves in maintaining their privileged
status. The immigrants' "gentle cynicism" is a much more genuine reaction to
the world as it is, reflecting an attitude less likely to alienate a lawyer from her
environment. The immigrant lawyer's valuing of community does make work more
meaningful and humane. With all this I agree. Where I dissent from Tom Shaffer
is his failure to fully address two problems related to his analysis: the significant
tension between friendship and fair dealing in public life and the monumental ten-
sion between community and equality in American racial relations. He seems to
acknowledge these sort of tensions as problems of "preference", but does not ade-
quately deal with them. He may be attempting to do so by his distinction between
loyalty and fidelity and through some of his narratives. But his distinctions here
are not convincing when applied to concrete situations, and his narratives, the fic-
tional black politician and the Boston police desk sergeant for example, only seem
to highlight, not resolve the problem of preference. There is an answer, however.
Within the four corners of Tom Shaffer's analysis there are the seeds of an alter-
native alternative. Sam Williamson provides an example.
Tom Shaffer only briefly discusses Sam and Pete Williamson, the father and
son immigration lawyers from Houston. He discusses them in the context of his
first group of dissenters, the scoffers. We are told that the second group of dissenters,
the "immigrant lawyers" with whom Tom is chiefly concerned, "turn, not so much
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to anger or bureaucratic adjustment (as the scoffing immigration lawyers are pre-
sumed to do) as to an alternative ethic," friendship and community. There seem
to be some missed ironies here. Most obviously, it is ironic that Sam and Pete
Williamson, the immigration lawyers-persons who really aid today's immigrants-
are grouped with the "scoffers", not with the "immigrant lawyers" who seem in
Tom's analysis to have reached a higher stage of moral development with their
alternative ethic. It is not just a verbal coincidence that we find immigrant "roots"
in the appellation applied to both sets of lawyers. It is a further irony that Tom's
sketchy description of the Williamsons, a sort of parenthetical remark to his exten-
sive narratives on Holtzman and Kennedy, reveals on close scrutiny not scoffers,
but perhaps a third group of dissenters, different from the two identified by Tom
and more likely than either to promote social virtue. The alternative ethic of this
third group incorporates the values of community and friendship practiced by
Holtzman and Kennedy, but adds a teleological element that resists the problems
of prejudice and corruption identified above.
Two quotes from Sam Williamson illustrates this alternative alternative ethic.
"It comes natural for a Jew to become an immigration lawyer. There's something
vestigial, something in your blood. We've been strangers so long we resent it." 3
The second quote is also a part of Williamson's explanation for being an immigra-
tion lawyer. It is more succinct: "Also, I don't like the government."' These remarks
reveal a man practicing the values of community with a concern for social ends
lacking in Tom Shaffer's second group of dissenters. In addition to being an im-
migration lawyer, Williamson's comments show him also to be an immigrant lawyer
a la Shaffer. But the lessons he has learned in his American immigrant community
teach him two things apparently lost on the Michael Novak and George V. Higgins
school of immigrant legal practice. First, for the values of community to be social-
ly virtuous in polyglot and racially divided America, they must be inclusive, not
exclusive. It seems likely that Williamson would represent with equal fervor Hai-
tians, Latinos, and Turks not so much because of the self-interested political
pluralism described by Higgins, but because Williamson's ethically based notions
of community were expansive enough to encompass the excluded and oppressed
of any hue. Second, a certain political content in Williamson's attitude, expressed
in his dislike for the government, makes one think he would line up not with Indira
Gandhi, but with the newspaper publisher that opposed her, despite the pull of
friendship. Although Tom attempts to distinguish friendship from blind loyalty,
his own examples of the Boston police desk sergeant and the Massachusetts House
Speaker, not to mention the still more convincing real-world examples of Gandhi
and Mayor Daley, demonstrate that the values practiced in the name of community
and friendship are often those of favoritism and corruption if moral ends are not
held paramount.
I ld. at 632.
4 Id. at 633.
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Tom Shaffer would have his virtuous lawyers practice humanism without
politics, and I do not believe that is possible. The humanism we learn from our
immigrant communities is indeed an important lesson. It is preferable to the self-
righteousness of the old-boy ethics, as Tom asserts, but it is not always enough.
Without the moral content of fair and egalitarian social ends, it can be perverted
to a philosophical justification for corruption of public life and oppression by the
newly empowered.
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